To keep the pace with the development of internet technology, remote user authentication techniques become more and more important to protect user's privacy. Recently, Kumari, et al., presented 
Introduction
With the rapid development of network technology, remote user authentication has become an indispensable part of life to access to the worthy resources, which are provided by the host across the network by the remote systems. And before having the access to the services, people should be verified to be a legal user through the authentication of the remote system. Otherwise, an attacker could pretend to be a legal user to log in the system and get the resources. That is, only the legal user through the authentication of the remote system could have the access to the service, or an attacker could easily log in the system. As a result, researchers pay more attention on the secured issues and users' authentication.
The authentication techniques are essential to guarantee the users' legality. In 1981, Lamport [1] had come-up with a remote authentication based on password Table to authenticate the right of logging in the system. Later, many improved schemes are proposed on the security and efficiency [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . However, those schemes need a Table of passwords or some values related to password stored by the server to complete the authentication. Once an adversary got the Table, the system would be partly or completely broken and users would suffer a lot.
To avoid the verified Table [8, 10, 11] , researchers proposed some schemes based on static ID of users' identities which could widely leak the information of the legal users. But adversary may obtain the ID and other massages to disguise as a user to log into the remote systems. And many static ID-based remote user authentications can't provide users with the convenience of password change or verify the validity of the login requests without any verify Table. To overcome these risks and improve the efficiency and security, many applications and researches [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] based on dynamic ID have been done. And owing to the features of portability, low cost, cryptographic and computational U 's dynamic identity 1 2 3 , , T T T 
Registration Phase
In this phase, we can know that if a user i U would like to become a legal user of this system i S , i U should carry out the following steps. Figure 1 .
Select a random number Server private key : Server's secret number: 
TN TM n   gets the current time 
Cryptanalysis of Kumari, et al., Scheme
Kumari, et al., claimed that their proposed scheme can resist smart card loss attack, user impersonation, the server masquerading attack and so on. Besides, they could also provide user anonymity and untraceability. However, we find that their system actually fails to resist attacks mentioned above and can't provide user anonymity and untraceability. The detail steps of those attacks will be shown as follows. 
Smart Card Stolen or Loss Attack
ii TE r h y x  ,which ( || ) h y x is computed from step (1). 
User Impersonation
If user i U ' smart card was stolen or lost, from section 3.1, the attacker
and then computes ( || ) ii SK h TB r T T h y x  .
Server Masquerading Attack
The attacker gets{ ( || ), ( || )} i h ID x h y x by using the method mentioned above in section 3.1 and 3. 2) The attacker gets the current time 3 T and computes 
User's Identity is Traceable

The Proposed Scheme
In this part, we proposed a new scheme to resist those attacks, which consists of four phases: the registration phase, the login phase, authentication phase and password change phase. The detail steps will be shown as follows.
Registration Phase
In this phase, we can know that if a user 
Login Phase
TN TM n   gets the current time 1 T i S gets the current time 2 T and checks whether 1 T is valid, which means 21 T T T    . SK h TB r T T h y x Q  respectively. In the end, users can use the session key to encrypt or decrypt their massages for secret communication safely through a secure channel. Besides, the login and authentication phases of our proposed scheme are summarized in Figure 4. 
Password Change Phase
If the user i U wants to change his password in the system, he must take such steps as follows. And the proposed scheme of password change phase is summarized in Figure 5 . 
Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
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In this section, we will show that our scheme can overcome the drawbacks analyzed above and further can resist some other attacks. The details are shown in the following.
Users' Anonymity and Untraceability
We will show that any attacker can trace the identity i ID of a user in the proposed scheme. ID of a user in this system. Namely, this scheme can provide users' anonymity and untraceability.
Off-line Password Guessing Attack
Off-line password guessing attack means the attacker can use user's smart card to get the user's password off-line. In this scheme, the attacker stole a user's smart card. From the section 3.1, the attacker can get{ 
Smart Card Stolen or Loss Attack
Suppose the attacker E obtains the smart card of any user, we will show that E can't get any useful information out of those extracted values. TB . Therefore, the scheme can resist the smart card stolen or loss attack.
Resist Server Masquerading and user Impersonation Attack
If the attacker E wants to impersonate a legal user of the system, the attacker E needs to compute a correct login request { ii A h TB r T  , but he can't get the private key x or i TB .Therefore, the scheme can resist server masquerading attack.
Provides Forward Secrecy
Forward secrecy is a very important part of ensuring the security of users' information. h ID x r h y x h ID }, but he still won't get the number r , which is generated randomly in every round. Therefore, attacker can't compute the previous session keys properly.
Resist Replay Attack
The improved scheme uses the current timestamps to resist the relay attack. Namely, upon receiving the login request message { ' 1 , , , , ,
CID TN TC TF T DS } from users, the server checks the validity of 1 T immediately. Similarly, the user receives the response message { A , 3 T } from the server and then verifies the legality of 3 T firstly. If the timestamps was out of deadline, the server or users will reject those request messages. So, the scheme can resist replay attack.
Insider Attack
In the improved scheme, users transmit a nonce i R instead of the plaintext password. To protect the password from insider attack, user i U uses a random number n and submits the value of ( || )
ii R h n PW  .But insiders don't know both of { , i n PW }, this is, it is less likely to guess the two value in polynomial time. Therefore, the attacker doesn't have the chance to guess the probable password and test his guess right. Namely, this scheme can provide full resistance of insider attack.
Provides Mutual Authentication
In the proposed scheme, the server verifies the legal user by the method of checking the validity of equation to authenticate the server. By the way, based on the analysis of section 5.4, no one can pretend to be a legal user or server to deceive others. So, the scheme can provide proper mutual authentication.
Provides Session Key
In the improved scheme, the user 
SK h h ID x r T T h y x h h ID r
 holds. Then the user can transmit any information he wants to the server and the server can also provide any service he can to the legal users confidentially. Based on the rigorous analysis of section 5.5, the scheme can provide forward secrecy. That is, the scheme can provide reasonably and secure session key.
Performance and Efficient Comparison
In this section, we will compare the proposed scheme with Kumari, et al., Chang, et al., and Chou, et al., [29] on the aspects of performance and efficiency. The first Table will exhibit us that ours can resist all attacks mentioned in the Table 2 .
The third Table will show the efficiency of those four schemes. In each scheme, there Table 2 , we can know that our proposed scheme is obviously more efficient than other four schemes in the login and authentication phase on the foundation of safety. What's more, our scheme can change password without the need to connecting the server and taking no consideration of internet's condition. Besides, registration operation only needs to be carried out one time for every legal user, but the login and authentication phase is more likely to take place one more times in a short time. Thus, ours is more convenient and practical than other three schemes.
Table 2. The Efficiency Comparison
In Table 3 , we will display the security properties referring to security analysis among those four schemes.
Table 3. The Performance Comparison
From the Table 3 , our proposed scheme is more secure than other three schemes, which are similar with each other among the login and authentication phases. And ours can resist all attacks mentioned above, but each of other three schemes has its own drawbacks.
Conclusions
In this study, we have reviewed the Kumari, et al., scheme with basic secure analysis, which described an improved remote user authentication scheme with key agreement. Their scheme is more vulnerable to smart card stolen or loss attack, user impersonation and server masquerading attack. Besides, user's identity is traceable in their scheme and their scheme lacks of the forward secrecy. Then, we propose an improved scheme to resist those attacks and analyze the security of our scheme. After that, the advantages of our scheme have been shown by contrast of the performance and efficiency with other three schemes. It shows that our proposed scheme is more secure and applicable to practice.
